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Insurance Questions in Voir Dire
Kenneth S. Kabb*
T HE PROBLEM OF SELECTING a fair and impartial jury is as old as the
jury system itself1 and is of particular importance today.2 Through-
out the centuries, trial before a jury of one's peers has been inexorably
linked with the idea of fairness.3 While not without problems, this
system remains one of the bulwarks of liberty in the United States. 4
This note deals with one of these problems: the impact of the insurance
business, with its rapid and substantial growth in recent years, upon
the selection of a fair and impartial jury in negligence cases.5 Because
of the tremendous burgeoning of the automobile industry, many of
these cases involve automobile accidents; the principles, however, apply
as well to any form of negligence action.
The scope of this article includes the voir dire examination in the
federal courts, primarily in civil cases. The questions to be considered
are: (1) how is the voir dire examination to be conducted; (2) what
are the limitations imposed on the trial judge, counsel, and the parties
with respect to the manner and conduct of the questioning; (3) what
is the allowable scope of questions that may be asked prospective
jurors; and (4) what will constitute reversible error, and who has the
burden of proof.
The right of trial by jury existed at common law before the adoption
of the Constitution,6 and in the federal courts in civil cases it is pre-
served by the Seventh Amendment. 7 That the jury be impartial is in-
* B.S.M.E., Ohio Univ.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 It was Cambyses II, King of Persia (now Iran), who inaugurated the "twelve-man
jury" in 500 B.C. He contended it was necessary for all twelve-good men and true
-serving on jury duty, each to have been born under one of the twelve Zodiacal
signs. Each member would thereby have a different planetary influence, enabling
them to render a just verdict. McCready, Challenging Jurors, 58 Dick. L. Rev. 384
(1954).
2 See generally, J. Frank, Courts on Trial, Myth and Reality in American Justice
(1949) 108-125.
3 "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neigh-
bors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308. 25 L.Ed. 664, 666
(1880).
4 Frank, op. cit. supra note 2 at 126-145. See also, Palmer, On Trial: The Jury Trial,
20 F.R.D. 65 (1958).
5 See generally, Prosser, Torts § 84, pp. 568-577 (3rd ed. 1964).
6 The right is to, ". . . a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law,
and includes all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and
England when the Constitution was adopted." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
288, 50 S.Ct. 253, 254, 74 LEd. 854, 858 (1930).
7 U.S. Const., Amend. VII.
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herent in the Fifth Amendment's requirement of "due process of law," s
and it is the "constitutional purpose of the voir dire examination . . .
to make sure that the jury is impartial." 9 Perhaps the most effective
means of securing a fair and impartial jury is through an intelligent
and legitimate exercise of the right of challenge, both peremptory and
for cause.' 0 During the voir dire examination," prospective jurors are
questioned in an effort to determine whether any reasons exist which
would disqualify them from serving as jurors in that particular case.
Jurors are rejected by means of the challenge, which may be for cause
(for a reason), or may be peremptory (no reason at all required).12 In
the leading case of Connors v. United States,'- the Court said:
A suitable inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the
juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or con-
trol the fair determination by him of the issues to be tried. That
inquiry is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a
great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. This
is the rule in civil cases, and the same rule must be applied in
criminal cases...
Voir dire in the federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 14 Wide discretion is given the trial judge, both in
the manner in which the voir dire examination is conducted, 15 and in
its permissible substantive content.'0 As a result of this broad discretion,
a wide range of practice has been adopted by the various district
8 U.S. Const., Amend. V. Where a state, although not required to do so, does pro-
vide for juries, the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal protection" clause contemplates
a fair and impartial jury. See also, Dowling, Constitutional Law 624, n. 3 (6th ed.
1959).
9 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System,
26 F.R.D. 411, 465 (1960).
10 Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., 25 F.2d 240, 241 (6th Cir. 1928); New Aetna
Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, 231 F. 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1916).
11 Voir dire means, literally, "to speak the truth." Black's Law Dictionary 1822 (3rd
ed. 1933).
12 "The traditional right of peremptory challenge recognizes that matters of bias or
prejudice may be sensed or suspected without possibility of proof, and therefore
permits counsel to exercise his inarticulate instinctive judgment, which he need not,
if he could, attempt to justify." Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 779 (3rd Cir.
1965).
13 158 U.S. 408, 413, 15 S. Ct. 951, 953, 39 L.Ed. 1033, 1035 (1895).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 47 (a).
15 Ibid. "Examination of Jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys
to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examina-
tion. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to sup-
plement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their
attorneys as it deems proper." Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is
identical except for the necessary change in the reference to criminal proceedings.
16 Connors v. United States, supra note 13.
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courts. 1 7 The examination of jurors may, within the discretion of the
court, be conducted by the court itself,' or by the parties or their at-
torneys. 19 If the court conducts the examination, it must permit the
parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further
questions as it deems proper, or it may itself submit additional ques-
tions. In a recent case 20 a Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the
trial court, having questions asked of the jury through its clerk, to-
gether with additional inquiries from counsel approved by the court, did
not abuse its discretion, although the better practice would have been
for the trial judge to have conducted the voir dire examination per-
sonally, including the reading of queries from counsel. This is ". . a por-
tion of the unescapable burden of judges," whose "immediate responsi-
bility" is for the court's sound functioning. 21 A more cautious trial court
has been sustained in its practice of inquiring of all the jurors, on the
first day of the adjourned term before the trial term, "... whether they
were stockholders, officers, agents, or employees of any insurance com-
pany." 22 In the Fifth Circuit case of Martin v. Burgess, 23 Judge Sibley
recommended that, with respect to ". . . defendant's insurance and the
qualifications of the jurors, the court should privately ascertain whether
an insurance company would be affected by the result, and if so, with-
out needlessly publishing the fact of insurance, should on plaintiff's re-
quest exclude jurors interested in behalf of the insurer." 21 Whatever
the method used, its purpose is to insure that the voir dire is actually
effective in obtaining an impartial jury, and with reasonable expedi-
tion.25
The voir dire examination of jurors rests largely in the discretion
17 Duff v. Page, 249 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1957); For a discussion of the principles of
federal voir dire, and a survey of methods used in the district courts, see, The Jury
System in the Federal Courts-Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System, 26 F.R.D. 411, 465 (1960).
18 Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., 375 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United
States, 372 F.2d 710, 726 (8th Cir. 1967), reh. den. March 14, 1967; Ross v. United
States, 374 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1967); Spells v. United States, 263 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir.
1959); Duff v. Page, supra note 17; Braman v. Wiley, 119 F.2d 991, 993 (7th Cir.
1941); Cleveland Nehi Bottling Co. v. Schenk, 56 F. 2d 941, 942 (6th Cir. 1932).
19 Lentner v. Lieberstein, 279 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1960), reh. den. July 22, 1960; Bass
v. Dehner, 103 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1939), reh. den. May 1, 1939, cert. den. 308 U.S. 580,
60 S. Ct. 100; Wagner Electric Corp. v. Snowden, 38 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1930); Arm-
borst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., supra note 10; New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v.
Hatt, supra note 10, at 617-619; Stewart v. Brune, 179 F. 350 (8th Cir. 1910).
20 United States v. Woods, 364 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1966), reh. den. Sept. 1966.
21 Ibid.
22 City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dankmer, 52 F.2d 929, 930 (4th Cir. 1931).
23 Martin v. Burgess, 82 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1936).
24 Id. at 324.
25 Duff v. Page, supra note 17.
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of the trial court, subject to the essential demands of fairness. 2 Courts
have viewed the problem of whether to allow voir dire examination to
determine the possible interest of jurors in insurance companies or the
insurance business, as a matter of ".... balancing the interest of one party
in having disinterested and unprejudiced jurors against possible prej-
udice to another party . . . by revealing the financial interest of . . . an
insurance company in the suit." 27 An alternative approach to the prob-
lem is a balancing of ".. . the probability of danger to plaintiffs that some-
one sympathetic to insurance companies may remain on the jury and
the danger to defendants that the jury may award damages without
fault if aware that there is insurance coverage to pay the verdict." 2S
The problem of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors was distinguished
from that of examining witnesses in the case of New Aetna Portland
Cement Co. v. Hatt,29 in 1916, although it appears to have been disre-
garded in at least one later case.3 0 In New Aetna, the court laid down
what is the majority rule today: questions concerning the possible con-
nection of prospective jurors may be asked on voir dire if they are
asked (1) in "good faith" and (2) ". . . for the purpose only of ascertain-
ing the fitness of persons summoned as jurors." The court reasoned that
• . . the most effective means of securing the right to trial by an
impartial jury is through an intelligent and legitimate exercise of
the right of challenge, both peremptory and for cause . . . The cir-
cumstances that the question has the additional effect of sug-
gesting the existence of a fact irrelevant to the merits of the case
(indemnity in this instance) is not an uncommon occurrence; this,
however, is to be remedied through precautionary instructions of
the court . 31
With this last statement, however, not all courts agree. "The re-
moval of the fly does not restore an appetite for the food into which it
has fallen." 32
The source of much confusion is the large discretion which the
courts have as to the propriety and good faith of questions propounded
to jurors upon their voir dire. An early case313 took the position that
insurance questions on voir dire could not be other than prejudicial as
2G Ross v. United States, supra note 18; Pope v. United States, supra note 18; Louis-
ville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Williams, 370 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350, 353 (3rd Cir. 1965); Kiernan v. Van Schaik, supra
note 12; Spells v. United States, supra note 18; Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308, 51 S.Ct. 470 (1931).
27 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Williams, supra note 26, at 842.
28 Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., supra note 18, at 297.
29 New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, supra note 10.
30 Pickwick Stage Lines v. Edwards, 64 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1933).
31 New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, supra note 10 at 617-619.
32 Stewart & Co. v. Newby, 266 F. 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1020).
33 Stewart v. Brune, supra note 19.
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indirect attempts to get before the jury extraneous matter or issues that
were foreign to the case. The same court later distinguished the case
on the ground that, in the earlier case, counsel had asked a question
concerning a specific company without laying a foundation for the ques-
tion, and without any reasonable cause to believe that the company
was interested in the case. In the later case of Wagner Electric Co. v.
Snowden, 4 counsel for the defendant had, without objection, stated the
fact and the name of an insurance company interested in the action. The
Wagner case was followed in the Tenth Circuit in Bass v. Dehner,35
which sustained the right of counsel for plaintiff to question prospective
jurors as to any interest or connection with an insurance company
"... apparently interested in the result of the case," but denied counsel
the right to interrogate defendant's counsel as to whether an insurance
company was interested in the case, as a basis for questioning jurors
on voir dire. These cases suggest that one judicial interpretation of the
"good faith" and "proper purpose" tests imposes upon plaintiff the
burden of showing that an insurance company is interested in the suit,
while denying him the use of disclosure to establish the fact.
Another test of good faith and proper purpose that the courts have
used is that of relevancy. In Smedra v. Stanek,36 the trial court refused
to question jurors on voir dire with respect to any possible interest in a
named insurance company. This refusal was held not to be an abuse of
discretion where there was no showing on the record that any juror knew
that the company was interested in the suit or defending it. A difficult
burden was placed on the plaintiff, in that he was required to prove the
subjective state of a juror's mind without being allowed the right to in-
quire into that which he must prove until he had proven it-a difficult
task indeed. Other cases have not been quite so stringent. In Strickland
v. Perry,37 the trial court was held not to have abused its discretion in
limiting inquiry by plaintiff's counsel where the purpose of examination
was "... to condition prospective jurors by placing before them certain of
plaintiff's contentions of fact and law, rather than to inquire into the
competency and qualifications of prospective jurors." 38 Again, in
Hebron v. Brown,39 the test of relevancy was applied. The trial court
was upheld in excluding questions on voir dire as to whether any
jurors were indebted to a bank, of which the senior member of the firm
of attorneys defending the action was president, and where he did not
appear in court. The bearing of the question on the impartiality of the
34 Wagner Electric Corp. v. Snowden, supra note 19.
35 Bass v. Dehner, supra note 19, at 36.
36 Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892, 895 (10th Cir. 1951).
37 Strickland v. Perry, 244 F.2d 24, 25 (5th Cir. 1957), reh. den. May 23, 1957.
38 Ibid.
39 Hebron v. Brown, 248 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1957).
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jurors was considered ". . . too remote for serious consideration." 40 The
last in this line of "strictly oriented" appellate level cases is Lentner v.
Lieberstein,41 where the court imposed the burden on plaintiff of show-
ing the subjective state of a juror's mind by affidavits or the testimony
of witnesses, and out of the presence of the jury and when the asserted
need for asking about insurance company connections was "based on
something more than mere surmise," thus following the state rule in
the Illinois case of Wheeler v. Rudek.4 2 In Lentner,43 the court assumed
that a federal court could apply the state rule. Whatever may have
been the state of the law at the time Lentner was decided, however, that
assumption has been invalid since Hanna v. Plumer44 was decided by
the Supreme Court in 1965. Federal courts are under no duty to apply
state laws of procedure.
In contrast to the cases discussed above, another line of decisions
emanated from New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt,45 representing
a kind of "polarity" 46 in the development of the law. New Aetna47
was decided in 1916, six years after Stewart v. Brune.4s Eppinger &
Russell Co. v. Sheely 49 sustained the right of a plaintiff to inquire in
good faith into the possible interest in or business connections with an
insurance company, reasoning that if ". . . a surety be in fact the real
party interested in defending the action, it hardly would be contended
that one who is interested in such surety, as its agent or because of other
business connections, would be an impartial juror . . . In many cases
the truth can only become known by making inquiry on the voir dire." 50
In Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co.,51 decided the same year as the
Eppinger case, -5 2 plaintiff's counsel was denied the request that inquiry
be made of the prospective jurors whether they were stockholders
it*. in any traction or steam railroad company." The denial was held
to be reversible error. What is significant about this case is that (1)
40 Id. at 799.
41 Lentner v. Lieberstein, supra note 19.
42 Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947).
43 Lentner v. Lieberstein, supra note 19.
44 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965).
45 New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, supra note 10.
46 "The idea of polarity involves the assumption that every force meets with a re-
sistance, or contrary force; that all action is necessarily accompanied by a contrary
reaction, so that when anything persists we must find opposite forces in it." Cohen,
The Meaning of Human History 273 (2d ed. 1961).
47 New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, supra note 10.
48 Stewart v. Brune, supra note 19.
49 Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, 24 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1928).
50 Id. at 155.
51 Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., supra note 10.
52 Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, supra note 49.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss3/12
17 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
the question refers, not to a specific company "apparently interested in
the suit," 53 but to any company,54 and (2) that the Court of Appeals
accorded plaintiff's counsel the presumption 55 that ". . . the information
was desired for the proper purpose of testing the qualifications of the
jurors, to enable an intelligent exercise of the right of at least peremptory
challenge." A case decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
1941, holding that the trial court's, ". . . large discretion as to the
propriety and good faith of questions propounded jurors upon their voir
dire," 5, is ". . . limited only by the good faith of the lawyer propounding
the question," 57 illustrates the thrust of the later cases in the direction
of a more liberal attitude toward the mention of insurance during the
voir dire examination.
A leading case is Kiernan v. Van Schaik,5s decided in 1965. This
was an action for damages for personal injuries arising from a fall on
the sidewalk entrance to the defendant's gas station. Plaintiff's counsel
requested that the trial judge put three questions to prospective jurors
on voir dire, pertaining to present or prior associations with casualty
insurers, and two further questions pertaining to the jurors' experience
and opinions with respect to insurance rates and the size of verdicts
in personal injury cases. The trial court refused to propound these
questions to the prospective jurors, apparently on three grounds: (1)
the practice in state and federal courts in Delaware was not to conduct
any extensive voir dire; (2) Delaware counsel, who appeared in this
case, obtained information on prospective jurors through the use of an
investigating agency; and (3) a prima facie showing of prospective
jurors' connections with the insurance business was required before the
questions would be considered. 59 (The fourth and fifth questions were
held to have been properly refused within the discretion of the Court,60
and are relatively less important for the purposes of this article.)
Restating the general rule that the manner of conduct, and the sub-
stantive content of the voir dire examination are within the broad dis-
cretion of the trial court, subject to the essential demands of fairness,"1
the appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in re-
fusing to put the first three questions to the prospective jurors. 6 2 The
53 Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., supra note 10 at 241.
54 See also, Cleveland Nehi Bottling Co. v. Schenk, supra note 18.
55 Armborst v. Cincinnati Traction Co., supra note 10 at 241.
56 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Davis, 41 F.2d 342, at 346 (10th Cir. 1930).
57 Braman v. Wiley, supra note 18 at 993.
58 Kiernan v. Van Schaik, supra note 12.
59 Id. at 777.
60 Id. at 783.
61 Id. at 778.
62 Id. at 779. "The rejection of appropriate questions on voir dire for such erroneous
reasons amounts to an abuse of discretion."
Sept. 1968
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trial court's reliance on an existing practice of a limited voir dire ex-
amination, which denied ". . . its use to assist counsel in the exercise
of the right of peremptory challenge . . . and drastically curtailed it in
aid of the right of challenge for cause . . . amounted to an abuse of
discretion." 63 "The Court below exercised no discretion, but applied
a supposed and erroneous principle of general application." 4 Investiga-
tion reports are an inadequate substitute for voir dire, because the
jurors impartiality should be tested under the control of the court
rather than by the unsupervised activity of investigators, with all the
undesirable possibilities which such surveillance inevitably presents
6 5
Because it may not be assumed without inquiry that a jury is impartial,
litigants have the right, at the least, to some surface information re-
garding the prospective jurors. Such information may uncover ground
for challenge for cause, and if not it will be available in the intelligent
use of the peremptory challenge.(,( The requirement of a prima facie
showing of some connection between a prospective juror and the busi-
ness of insurance was rejected, as was the requirement of good faith.67
The problem as the court defined it was to protect the right to an
adequate voir dire "without any crippling limitations" and, at the same
time, to ". . . safeguard . . . the principle which restricts disclosure that
a defendant is insured." "s Underlying this problem is the "fundamental
fact of human character" that bias, by its very nature, goes beyond "...
a crudely direct financial interest in the result." 69 The approach of this
court would be to permit inquiry relevant in ascertaining bias, and
not bar it from the courtroom because it deals with insurance. Rather
than leave the existence of insurance to speculation, a frank and open
airing of the subject, together with an adequate explanation by the
court of the purpose of the voir dire and the bearing of insurance on
it, are the best means of preventing prejudice to either party.70 The rule
laid down by this court is that:
a plaintiff in an accident case may make reasonable inquiry
whether prospective jurors are or have been connected with the
business of investigating or paying accident claims, either as em-
ployees, agents or stockholders of insurance companies or claims
agencies without suggesting the existence of insurance in the case.
An adequate caution should be given by the court to make it clear
to the jury that these questions do not imply either that any de-
63 Id. at 778.
64 Id at 780.
65 Ibid.
G6 Id. at 779.
67 Id. at 780, 781.
68 Id. at 781.
69 Ibid.
70 Id. at 782.
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fendant is insured or that the matter of insurance or lack of in-
surance is to be considered in reaching a verdict.7 1
Thus, Kiernan v. Van Schaik stands for the principle that parties
may have wide latitude in questioning prospective jurors on their voir
dire to uncover bias, subject to the limitations of "reasonableness" or
"relevancy," and that such prejudicial mention of insurance as may
occur should be neutralized by proper instructions to the jury from the
court. The requirement of good faith has been rejected.
It will be of some use to investigate the development of the cases
in the circuits vis a vis Kiernan v. Van Schaik,72 in order to assess the
state of the law and the impact of the departure of this case from the
usual requirements of good faith and showing of a need for interrogating
jurors concerning insurance business associations. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in the case of Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., Inc.,
7 3
sustained the trial court's refusal to permit inquiry into the experiences
of prospective jurors with guns in this hunting accident case, where the
trial judge had permitted plaintiff to ask whether any prospective juror
was a member of any national gun organization, or of any gun club.
Commenting the counsel's question was ". . . general and imprecise,"
the court held that, in light of the questions allowed, there was no evi-
dence that plaintiff had been denied information necessary to exercise
an intelligent use of peremptory challenges, therefore, there was no
abuse of discretion as required in the Kiernan case for reversal.
The principles of the Kiernan case were extended to criminal ac-
tions in the case of United States v. Napoleone.74 In a dissent in Hutton
v. Fisher,75 Kiernan was cited as authority for the right of a party to
participate in the selection of a jury.76 The same court 77 later ex-
tended the Kiernan case to the examination of witnesses, commenting
that the mention of insurance in a trial is not necessarily fatal, but that
the context in which it is laid is of controlling importance. District
courts in the Third Circuit have differed on the issue of pretrial dis-
covery of the existence and amount of insurance coverage, one case7s
allowing it and another 79 denying it. The latest case,80 decided in June,
1967, by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
71 Ibid.
72 Supra note 12.
73 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. den., 384 U.S. 959, 86 S.Ct. 1584.
74 Supra note 26.
75 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966), reh. den. May, 1966.
76 Id. at 919.
77 Corbett v. Borandi, 375 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1967).
78 Slomberg, Adm'r, v. Permabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (3d Cir. 1967).
79 Gangemi v. Moore, 268 F.Supp. 19 (D.C. Del. 1967).
80 Tabor v. Miller, 269 F.Supp. 647 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1967).
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cited Kiernan as indicating ". . . a trend by the courts toward a liberali-
zation of the rule which rigidly precludes the mention of insurance in
personal injury actions." 81 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as-
sumed a posture contrary to Kiernan v. Van Schaik in the recent case
of Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc.s 2 The court sustained the trial
court's refusal to interrogate jurors concerning insurance connections,
absent a showing of compelling need to propound such questions. Thus,
in the Fourth Circuit, restriction of the right to an adequate voir dire
is not error without a showing of prejudice, whereas in the Third Cir-
cuit no such showing is required. The bone of contention is the danger
that the jury may award damages without fault if aware that there is
insurance coverage to pay the verdict.8 3 A later district court case 4
in the same Fourth Circuit, however, quoted with approval the following
from Kiernan v. Van Schaik: 85
The word "insurance" is not outlawed from the courtroom as a
word of magical evil. Jurors are not unaware that insurance is at
large in the world and its mention will not open to them a pre-
viously unknown realm.
The Fifth Circuit adheres to the majority rule requirements of good
faith 6 and proper purpose,8 7 but apparently somewhat more latitude is
allowed in criminal8 8 than in civil8 9 actions in the scope of interrogation
on voir dire. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has, since 1916, been
in substantial agreement with Kiernan v. Van Schaik.9°
In the recent case of Fosness v. Panagos,91 the Supreme Court of
Michigan, affirming by an equally divided court, cited Kiernan v. Van
Schaik as authority for the right to make reasonable inquiry into pro-
spective jurors' connections with the insurance business, subject to later
cautionary instructions by the court. A Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case 92 has held that the examination of jurors, within the discretion
of the court, was ". . . limited only by the good faith of the lawyer pro-
pounding the question." 91 In a later case,94 the same court imposed a
81 Id. at 649.
82 Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc., supra note 18.
83 Kiernan v. Van Schaik, supra note 12, at 781.
84 Vaughan v. Southern Bakeries Co., 247 F.Supp. 782 (D.C. S.Car. 1965).
85 Kiernan v. Van Schaik, supra note 12 at 782.
86 Eppinger & Russell Co. v. Sheely, supra note 49.
87 Strickland v. Perry, supra note 37.
88 Spells v. United States, sup-ra note 18.
89 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Williams, supra note 26.
90 Kiernan v. Van Schaik, supra note 12.
91 376 Mich. 485, 138 N.W.2d 380 (1965).
92 Braman v. Wiley, supra note 18.
93 Id. at 993.
94 Lentner v. Lieberstein, supra note 19.
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heavy burden upon the plaintiff, ". . . to show, by affidavits or the testi-
mony of witnesses, or both, . . . that the asserted need for asking prospec-
tive jurors about insurance company connections is based on something
more than mere surmise." 95 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
followed Kiernan v. Van Schaik in two recent cases involving criminal
actions, 96 but has not decided any case strictly in point since 1930. 91 The
Ninth Circuit rule is that an interrogation of prospective jurors may be
made in good faith, and for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications
of jurors, but not for the purpose of informing them that there is insur-
ance in the case.98 The plaintiff, however, has the burden of proving that
denial of the right to question jurors is ". . . inconsistent with substantial
justice under Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 99 The
Tenth Circuit rule is that questions may be asked in good faith and for
the purpose of ascertaining the interests of jurors in insurance companies
apparently connected with the case, but discovery is not available to the
plaintiff for the purpose of showing that apparent interest.1° ° An older
case 1° ' decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia appears to follow the old Eighth Circuit rule of Stewart v.
Brune, 0 2 long since abandoned by that court,10 3 of strictly limiting the
right of inquiry. In view of the development of the law since that case
was decided in a contrary direction, the precedent value of the case is
doubtful.
The problem of insurance can arise in many different ways. The
independent variables in this analysis are: (1) the existence of insurance
coverage; (2) the jury's knowledge or belief as to its existence in the
case; (3) the actual policy limits if coverage exists; (4) the jury's state
of knowledge or belief as to the amount of coverage; (5) whether insur-
ance coverage is required by law; and (6) the jury's knowledge or belief
as to legally required insurance coverage. The dependent variables are:
(1) whether the finding of liability would tend to be greater or less; and
(2) whether the amount of damages awarded would be greater or less
than a "just amount."
It is widely believed that the existence of insurance, without more,
tends to destroy the concept of fault as the basis of liability. This is a
tenuous conclusion at best. The question whether the waning of fault as
95 Id. at 443.
96 Ross v. United States, supra note 18; Pope v. United States, supra note 18.
97 Wagner Electric Corp. v. Snowden, supra note 19.
98 Duff v. Page, supra note 17.
99 Id. at 140; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
100 Bass v. Dehner, supra note 19.
101 Hoagland v. Chestnut Farms Dairy, 72 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
102 Stewart v. Brune, supra note 19.
103 See, Wagner Electric Corp. v. Snowden, supra note 19.
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a basis of liability is a result of the increased incidence of insurance cov-
erage, or whether the increase coverage is a result of wider findings of
liability is difficult at best. Certainly the thrust of the law has been in
the direction of greater liability, as in the fields of workmen's compen-
sation, product liability, medical malpractice, and the like. It is far more
reasonable to assume that prudent businessmen and professionals have
adapted to the demands of higher population density, rapid technological
and industrial changes, and greater awareness of the need for compen-
sating injuries through greater use of insurance, than to assume that the
reverse is true. The more probable explanation is that greater liability
has caused a rise in insurance coverage, rather than that greater insur-
ance coverage has resulted in liability with less or without fault. 10 4 Many
fear that juries are more free with damage awards if they believe that
an insurance company rather than an individual defendant will pay.
Perhaps at one time this was true; it is not so today. Most jurors have
had sufficient experience with liability insurance to be aware that need-
lessly high verdicts will eventually result in higher insurance rates for
everyone-themselves included. Further, it is hardly fair to assume that
most people who serve on juries will be irresponsible in their verdicts.
On the contrary, many judges feel that juries are, by and the large, quite
fair.10 5 If in the face of this it be contended that defendants who are in
fact uninsured may pay excessive verdicts, then the answer is that it may
serve as an inducement for tortfeasors to carry insurance, and thus carry
their fair share of society's burden. That this is of considerable impor-
tance is attested to by the widespread adoption of automobile financial
responsibility statutes, 10 6 and by recent proposals of compensation plans
for automobile accident victims regardless of fault. 107 Most people tend
to assume the existence of insurance in a case, and reasonably so. Insur-
ance is an everyday fact of life.
The commonly held notion that where a jury believes the defendant
is insured the verdict will be higher than a fair amount, can also work
to the detriment of a plaintiff. Most automobile financial responsibility
laws require far less insurance coverage than the damages in a serious
personal injury case. It is likely that a jury will assume the statutory
amount of coverage in many cases. Thus, in a serious case, it might be
the defendant's desire to make the jury believe that the amount of cover-
age is only $5,000/$10,000, or some similarly low figure, in the hope that
any verdict will be limited by that amount. The same rationale would
104 See generally, Prosser, Torts 562-591 (3d ed. 1964).
105 See, Botein, Trial Judge, 196-210 (1952).
106 See generally, note Auto Insurance, The Great Debate, 3 Trial Mag. (6) Oct.-
Nov. 1967.
107 Id.; see also, "Trial," Vol. 3, No. 5, Aug.-Sept. 1967.
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tend to favor plaintiff in cases where the damages ought to be less than
the policy limits.
It ought to be transparently obvious that the court's preoccupation
with prejudice is not the real problem, but only an attempt by judges to
solve a larger social problem within the ambit of their own special tal-
ents. Assuming the worst-that juries are prejudiced against insurance
companies and for plaintiffs-is their attempt not reasonable and de-
sirable? What is the function of insurance, if not to distribute the risk
of injury and loss among all those deriving benefits from our highly
industrialized society? The real problem is that courts and juries have
been trying their best to make do with a system for compensating inju-
ries that has been woefully inadequate for many years. What is needed
more than anything else is a system for adequately compensating injuries
regardless of fault, based on the assumption that the wealthiest country
in the history of the world can afford to guarantee its injured citizens
a minimum standard of living and medical care.'08 Insurance can be
provided by the government or by government-regulated insurance com-
panies. Higher insurance premium rates, fines, or suspension of certain
privileges would discourage and deter negligent tortfeasors. That is
largely a job for the legislatures. The system for compensating injuries,
as it is, cannot work with any real degree of fairness.
The argument that injuries ought to be compensated by the tort-
feasor at their real worth is appealing on the surface. That injuries ought
to be compensated is certainly true. That the person responsible for the
injury ought to assume the burden of it is also true. That one tortfeasor
has prudently carried insurance, while another has not, ought not to
affect the money value placed on the plaintiff's injury, but it does. Juries
are not unaware that an extremely large verdict can ruin the individual
defendant. The matter becomes worse when the defendant will never be
able to satisfy the judgment. Then the result of the lawsuit is an injured
and only partly compensated plaintiff, and a financially ruined defendant.
The sense of fairness is strained further when both or neither of the
parties are at fault, but one only must bear the loss. The doctrine of
comparative negligence may at times operate to mitigate the severity of
the rule, but not adequately. If an injury is not fully compensated in the
courts then either the financial burden must be borne by someone else,
or the injured person must be left to rot at society's expense. If the
amounts of verdicts are influenced, as they almost certainly are, by the
existence and amount of insurance coverage, then uninsured defendants
are rewarded by lower judgments while prudently insured defendants
are penalized by higher verdicts. Thus, the only real answer is a system
of adequate, universal, and compulsory insurance. The relevant ques-
108 See, Fuchsberg, "Can We Afford Justice?," op. cit. supra note 106, at 49.
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tions then can be determined by the courts: is there a compensable
injury to the plaintiff, and is the defendant liable?
Conclusion
Since an adequate system of universal insurance coverage does not
exist, the immediate problem of insurance questions on voir dire must
be faced. Any jury member having a connection with a company or
industry affected by the outcome of the suit can hardly be presumed to
be impartial. The same is true if a juror holds an opinion or belief which
may tend to influence his decision in the case. Facts may exist, of which
the juror may be himself unaware, rendering an impartial decision on his
part unlikely. Wise and experienced lawyers regard the selection of an
impartial jury as the cornerstone of a fair trial. Lawyers attempt to ex-
clude jurors likely to be unsympathetic to their client's cause, and to
retain sympathetic jurors. The result is ideally a jury panel with no
strong preconceived attitudes for or against either party, but often is a
practical balancing of the prejudices of the individual jurors. The courts
have correctly framed the problem in terms of prejudice. Prejudice by
its very nature implies pre-formed attitudes, consciously or unconscious-
ly held. The most effective means of dispelling prejudice is frank and
open discussion of its elements. In this situation, the elements are a
juror's possible connection or his identification with the insurance busi-
ness. Where a juror be connected with an insurance company, for exam-
ple, as an employee, agent, or claims adjustor, or interested as a stock-
holder or policy holder, his impartiality cannot be assumed. These are fit
subjects for inquiry on voir dire in a proper case. If the mention of
insurance in voir dire is prejudicial per se, then it ought not to be men-
tioned at all. That, however, is not the case. A distinguished trial law-
yer has said: 109
Words, like living things, are chemical. A word in one context will
be soothingly unimportant. The same word in another context will
have an explosive effect on the emotions. It is the sequence and the
mixture which turn the benign chemical into a volcanic force.
Context is all important. The tests of good faith, purpose of ascertaining
qualifications of jurors, relevance, and reasonableness have all attempted
to delimit that wide area of context within which inquiry will be allowed,
and beyond the pale of which it will not.
The tests of good faith and proper purpose refer to a standard of
conduct for counsel. Supposedly, the object of the questions asked must
be to ascertain the qualifications of jurors, and not to suggest to the jury
that there is an insurance company standing in the background ready to
pay the verdict. For reasons already discussed, the jury will wonder
109 Nizer, The Jury Returns, 137 (1966).
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about the existence of insurance anyway, and will probably assume that
the defendant is covered. The tests of good faith and proper purpose are
thereby rendered nugatory. Whatever may have been the case fifty years
ago, jurors cannot be expected to be ignorant of the fact of insurance
today. Since bias can arise whether an insurance company is interested
in the suit or not, plaintiff's counsel should not be made to show the
existence of an insurance company interested in the suit before being
allowed to inquire on voir dire. If the right of challenge is to be effec-
tive, particularly the right of peremptory challenge, plaintiff ought not
be placed under the heavy burden of having to prove prejudicial error
in being denied the information necessary to an intelligent exercise of
the right of challenge. If those facts could be shown, peremptory chal-
lenge would be unnecessary, challenge for cause would have been
allowed, and the whole matter would not be before the court. There-
fore, the denial or impairment of the right of challenge by unnecessarily
limiting voir dire should be reversible error without a showing of preju-
dice, as held in the Kiernan case. Finally, the proper test of the scope of
inquiry ought to be reasonableness. It is within the judge's discretionary
powers to limit the voir dire examination to information reasonably nec-
essary to discover bias. Under the Kiernan holding, the balance is tipped
in favor of a liberal voir dire, subject to the limits of reasonableness.
Any prejudice that might result from the inquiry can be most effectively
dealt with through instructions by the court. An intelligent and reasoned
explanation by the court is most certainly preferable to the unconfirmed
speculation of the jury room. The principles of Kiernan v. Van Schaik
are sound, and should exert more influence in the future.
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